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1842 
Article 
Compliance of the United States with 
International Labor Law 
David Weissbrodt & Matthew Mason†
  INTRODUCTION   
 
The United States is one of 185 member states of the In-
ternational Labour Organization (ILO).1 Despite holding a 
permanent seat on the ILO Governing Body, the United States 
is a party to only 14 of the 189 labor conventions2
 
†  The authors thank Steven Befort, Laura Cooper, Karianne Jones, 
Matt Norris, and César F. Rosado Marzán for their assistance in preparing 
this Article. Copyright © 2014 by David Weissbrodt & Matthew Mason. 
 and two of 
 1. Alphabetical List of ILO Member Countries, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/ 
public/english/standards/relm/country/htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2014). 
 2. These include ILO Convention (No. 53) Concerning the Minimum Re-
quirement of Professional Capacity for Masters and Officers on Board Mer-
chant Ships (as modified by the Final Articles Revision Convention), Oct. 24, 
1936, 40 U.N.T.S. 154; Convention (No. 54) Concerning Annual Holidays with 
Pay for Seamen (as modified by the Final Articles Revision Convention), Oct. 
24, 1936, 7 Wiktor 297; Convention (No. 55) Concerning the Liability of the 
Shipowner in Case of Sickness, Injury or Death of Seamen (as modified by the 
Final Articles Revision Convention), Oct. 24, 1936, 40 U.N.T.S. 171; Conven-
tion (No. 57) Concerning Hours of Work on Board Ship and Manning (as modi-
fied by the Final Articles Revision Convention), Oct. 24, 1936, 7 Manley 
Ottmer Hudson et al. International A Collection of the Texts of Multipartite 
Instruments of General Interest Beginning with the League of Nations 470; 
Convention (No. 58) Fixing the Minimum Age for the Admission of Children to 
Employment at Sea (as modified by the Final Articles Revision Convention), 
Oct. 24, 1936, 40 U.N.T.S. 206; Convention (No. 74) Concerning the Certifica-
tion of Able Seamen (as modified by the Final Articles Revision Convention), 
June 29, 1946, 94 U.N.T.S. 11; Convention (No. 80) Final Articles Revision 
Convention, Oct. 9, 1946, 38 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention (No. 144) Concerning Tri-
partite Consultations to Promote the Implementation of International Labour 
Standards, June 21, 1976, 1089 U.N.T.S. 354; Convention (No. 147) Concern-
ing Minimum Standards in Merchant Ships, Oct. 29, 1976, 1259 U.N.T.S. 335; 
Convention (No. 150) Concerning Labour Administration: Role, Functions and 
Organisation, June 26, 1978, 1201 U.N.T.S. 179; Convention (No. 160) Con-
cerning Labour Statistics, June 25, 1985, 1505 U.N.T.S. 39. See Ratifications 
for United States, ILO, https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p= 
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eight core conventions.3 The United States Department of La-
bor declares that U.S. laws and practices “meet or exceed many 
ILO conventions.”4
I.  ILO FRAMEWORK   
 There are, however, significant reasons to 
doubt that self-serving U.S. comment. This article examines 
the level of U.S. compliance with ILO standards, particularly in 
regard to the right to organize, the right to bargain collectively, 
the right to strike, treatment of public employees, rights of 
noncitizen workers, treatment of children, anti-union discrimi-
nation, treatment of women, and complaint procedures.  
The ILO is dedicated to promoting four main objectives: 
These objectives are to advance (1) fundamental principles of 
rights at work, (2) greater opportunities for obtaining employ-
ment meeting those conditions, (3) enhanced coverage and ef-
fectiveness of social protection for all, and (4) tripartism (in-
volving governments, employers, and workers) and social 
dialogue in labor relations.5 The ILO achieves these objectives 
through its Constitution6 and the related Declaration of Phila-
delphia (1944),7 189 labor conventions,8 202 recommendations,9 
the 1998 Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work (1998 Declaration),10
 
NORMLEXPUB:11200:0::NO::P11200_COUNTRY_ID:102871 (last visited 
Apr. 1, 2014). 
 and mechanisms for member state 
 3. These are ILO Convention (No. 105) Concerning the Abolition of 
Forced Labour, June 25, 1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 291 and Convention (No. 182) 
Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the 
Worst Forms of Child Labour, June 17, 1999, 2133 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter 
ILO Convention No. 182].  
 4. ILO Standards, BUREAU INT’L LAB. AFF., http://www.dol.gov/ilab/ 
programs/oir/PC-ILO-page2.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2014). 
 5. Missions and Objectives, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/ 
mission-and-objectives/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2014). 
 6. ILO, Constitution of the ILO (Apr. 1, 1919), http://www.ilo.org/public/ 
english/bureau/leg/download/constitution.pdf [hereinafter ILO, Constitution]. 
 7. ILO, Declaration Concerning the Aims and Purposes of the Interna-
tional Labour Organisation (Declaration of Philadelphia) (May 10, 1944), 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:62:0::NO:62:P62_LIST_ENTRIE_ 
ID:2453907:NO#declaration [hereinafter Declaration of Philadelphia]. 
 8. NORMLEX INFO. SYS. ON INT’L LABOUR STANDARDS, Conventions, 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12000:0::NO::: (last visited Apr. 1, 
2014). 
 9. NORMLEX INFO. SYS. ON INT’L LABOUR STANDARDS, Recommenda-
tions, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12010:0:NO:: 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2014). 
 10. NORMLEX INFO SYS. ON INT’L LABOUR STANDARDS, 1998 Declaration 
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ 
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reporting and monitoring compliance with the conventions and 
recommendations including the Committee on Freedom of As-
sociation.11 Aside from the Constitution and the 1998 Declara-
tion, the most significant ILO instruments are eight core labor 
conventions, addressing forced labor,12 freedom of association,13 
organization and collective bargaining,14 equal remuneration,15 
discrimination,16 and child labor.17
II.  UNITED STATES FRAMEWORK   
 
In order to compare U.S. labor law and ILO standards, it is 
important to understand the main statute and administrative 
body that governs U.S. labor law. The National Labor Relations 
Act (NLRA, Wagner Act) of 193518
 
normlex/en/f?p=1000:62:0::NO:62:P62_LIST_ENTRIE_ID:2453911:NO (last 
visited Apr. 1, 2014) [hereinafter 1998 Declaration]; see also ILO, Declaration 
on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization (June 10, 2008), http://www.ilo 
.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---cabinet/documents/genericdocument/ 
wcms_099766.pdf (representing the third major statement of principles adopt-
ed by the ILO since the Constitution, which builds upon and reaffirms the 
Declaration of Philadelphia and the 1998 Declaration in the context of globali-
zation). 
 protects the rights of U.S. 
employees and their employers in the private sector, including 
 11. Committee on Freedom of Association, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/global/ 
standards/applying-and-promoting-international-labour-standards/committee 
-on-freedom-of-association/lang--en/index.htm (last visited on Apr. 1, 2014). 
 12. ILO, Convention (No. 29) Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, 
June 28, 1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 55; ILO, Convention (No. 105) Concerning the Abo-
lition of Forced Labour, June 25, 1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 291 (ratified by the Unit-
ed States).  
 13. ILO, Convention (No. 87) Concerning Freedom of Association and Pro-
tection of the Right to Organise, July 9, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17 [hereinafter ILO 
Convention No. 87]. 
 14. ILO, Convention (No. 98) Concerning the Application of the Principles 
of the Right to Organize and to Bargain Collectively, July 1, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 
257 [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 98]. 
 15. ILO, Convention (No. 100) Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men 
and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value, June 29, 1951, 165 U.N.T.S. 
303 [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 100]. 
 16. ILO, Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of 
Employment and Occupation, June 25, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter ILO 
Convention No. 111]. 
 17. ILO, Convention (No. 138) Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to 
Employment, June 26, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 297 [hereinafter ILO Convention 
No. 138]; ILO, Convention (No. 182) Concerning the Prohibition and Immedi-
ate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, June 17, 
1999, 2133 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 182] (ratified by the 
United States). 
 18. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012) [here-
inafter NLRA]. 
  
2014] INTERNATIONAL LABOR COMPLIANCE 1845 
 
employee rights to organize and bargain collectively,19 and de-
fines certain unfair labor practices,20 procedures for union rep-
resentation and elections,21 and judicial review.22 The National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is the administrative agency 
charged with implementing the NLRA.23 In 1947, Congress en-
acted the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA” or “Taft-
Hartley Act”) to amend the NLRA by defining several unfair 
labor practices of unions and clarifying the rights of employees 
to refrain from joining unions.24 In 1959, the Labor Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) addressed the 
problems of internal union corruption and undemocratic con-
duct of internal union affairs.25 The LMRDA amended the 
NLRA by instituting union financial reporting requirements, 
creating a bill of rights for union members, and imposing new 
restrictions on union activity.26
III.  COMPLIANCE OF THE UNITED STATES WITH 
INTERNATIONAL LABOR LAW   
 
The principles and rights established in the ILO Constitu-
tion and 14 ILO conventions ratified by the U.S. apply to feder-
al and state labor law.27 The United States, however, has only 
ratified two of the eight core ILO conventions, including the 
convention on the abolition of forced labor (ILO Convention No. 
105) and on the worst forms of child labor (ILO Convention No. 
182).28
 
 19. Id. § 151. 
 Only five other ILO member states have ratified two or 
 20. Id. § 158. 
 21. Id. § 159. 
 22. Id. § 160. 
 23. Id. § 153. 
 24. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 141–197 (2012). 
 25. See Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 401–531 (2012). 
 26. See id. (placing new restrictions on the right to strike, including more 
substantial limitations on picketing for representative rights and further limi-
tations on secondary activity). 
 27. See ILO, Constitution, supra note 6, at art. 19; Declaration of Phila-
delphia, supra note 7; 1998 Declaration, supra note 10; see also Steve 
Charnovitz, The ILO Convention on Freedom of Association and Its Future in 
the United States, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 90, 99 (2008) (noting that as of yet the 
United States has only ratified fourteen ILO Conventions). 
 28. Ratification of Fundamental Conventions by Country, ILO, https:// 
www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:10011:0::NO:10011:P10011_DISPLAY_ 
BY,P10011_CONVENTION_TYPE_CODE:1,F (last visited Apr. 1, 2014). The 
United States has never ratified the ILO Convention No. 87 (Concerning 
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less core conventions.29 Myanmar and Brunei Darussalam 
have, like the U.S., only ratified two core conventions, and 
Marshall Islands, Palau, and Tuvalu have ratified none of the 
core conventions.30 The vast majority of ILO member states, in-
cluding all the European nations with which the U.S. ordinarily 
compares itself, have ratified at least four of the core conven-
tions, and 138 ILO member states have ratified all eight core 
conventions.31 The 1998 Declaration also applies to the United 
States, in providing that all member states must respect, pro-
mote, and realize the fundamental principles and rights estab-
lished therein—regardless of which conventions they have rati-
fied.32 The ILO Constitution says that member states are not 
bound by the 202 ILO recommendations but are guided by their 
principles.33
Both the ILO and the United States recognize, but take 
varying positions, on the right to organize, the right to bargain 
collectively, the right to strike, treatment of public employees, 
rights of noncitizen workers, treatment of children, anti-union 
discrimination, and treatment of women.
 
34
 
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize) and ILO Con-
vention No. 98 (Concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to 
Organize and to Bargain Collectively). Id.  
 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id.  
 31. The twenty-eight European Union nations have ratified all eight core 
conventions. Id. 
 32. 1998 Declaration, supra note 10 (including principles of freedom of as-
sociation and the right to collective bargaining, abolition of forced labor, elimi-
nation of discrimination in employment, and elimination of child labor). It is 
particularly important that the eight core conventions are summarized into 
four core labor standards mentioned above (freedom of association and collec-
tive bargaining, no compulsory labor, discrimination, and child labor) and are 
considered to underpin these principles. E-mail from César F. Rosado Marzán, 
Assistant Professor of Law, Chi.-Kent Coll. of Law, to authors (Nov. 2013) 
[hereinafter Marzán E-mail] (on file with author). From this viewpoint, the 
Constitution, 1998 Declaration, and core conventions interrelate with one an-
other. See 1998 Declaration, supra note 10. 
 33. See Conventions and Recommendations, ILO, http://ilo.org/global/ 
standards/introduction-to-international-labour-standards/conventions-and 
-recommendations/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2014) (stating that 
recommendations are often designed to supplement a particular convention, 
and are meant to provide member states with guidance on legislative devel-
opment, labor policy, and management practice). 
 34. Cf. Complaint Against the Government of the United States Presented 
by the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America, supported 
by Public Services International, Report No. 344, Case No. 2460, ¶ 991 (hold-
ing that South Carolina labor laws result in the banning of certain trade un-
ions and therefore violate Conventions 87 and 98 of the ILO), cited by 
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A. THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE 
The ILO considers the right to organize to be a freedom 
that member states must establish and protect, without inter-
ference or previous authorization from public authorities or 
administrative agencies.35 As a result, ILO standards provide 
greater protection of the right to organize than the analogous 
U.S. provisions.36
1. Workers Entitled to the Right to Organize 
 This greater level of protection is particularly 
visible in the types of workers entitled to organize, election pro-
cedures, interference with the right to organize, and treatment 
of public employees. 
ILO Convention No. 87 states that workers “without dis-
tinction whatsoever, shall have the right to establish and . . . 
join organisations of their own choosing without prior authori-
sation.”37 Likewise, the NLRA provides workers the right to 
form, join, or assist labor organizations.38 The NLRA only ex-
tends this right, however, to statutorily defined employees.39
 
Charnovitz, supra note 
 
27, at 104; Steve Charnovitz, The U.S. International 
Labor Relations Act, 26 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 311, 318 (2011) (noting that 
there is a substantial record of U.S. non-compliance with ILO standards). 
 35. ILO, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: DIGEST OF DECISIONS AND PRINCI-
PLES OF THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE OF THE GOVERNING BODY 
OF THE ILO,  paras. 272–74, 309 (2006) [hereinafter ILO DIGEST], available at 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---normes/documents/ 
publication/wcms_090632.pdf (stating that freedom of association principles 
would be dead letter if required to get previous authorization). Previous au-
thorization includes authorizing the right to association, the establishment of 
an organization, and the need to obtain approval of an organization’s constitu-
tion or rules. Id. ¶ 272. 
 36. Cf. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (containing no mention of without 
interference or previous authorization). While ILO norms condemn any em-
ployer anti-union speech as interfering with freedom of association rights even 
if such speech is devoid of explicit threats, the NLRA permits employers to ex-
press their opinions regarding unionizing so long as there is no explicit “threat 
of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.” Id. § 158(c); Marzán E-mail, supra 
note 32. As long as a U.S. employer’s speech contains no explicit threats, such 
anti-union free speech rights may amount to what the ILO considers “interfer-
ence.” Id. Arguably, U.S. law recognizes employee rights to engage in protect-
ed activity without interference, so the question becomes what qualifies as “in-
terference” under the separate ILO and U.S. norms. Id. 
 37. ILO Convention No. 87, supra note 13, art. 2. ILO standards protect a 
greater number of employees than under U.S. standards. Compare id. (using 
the key language of “without distinction”), with NLRA § 157 (using no analo-
gous language). 
 38. See NLRA § 157. 
 39. Id. § 152. Additionally, the NLRA unfair labor practices provision only 
applies to statutorily defined employers. Id. 
  
1848 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [98:1842 
 
ILO standards provide greater employee coverage because 
nearly all public employees are included.40 By contrast, the 
NLRA excludes all federal and public employees in addition to 
independent contractors and agricultural workers.41 U.S. ratifi-
cation of ILO Convention No. 87 would broaden the class of 
employees currently covered under U.S. law to include most 
federal, state, and municipal employees.42
Differences also exist in the treatment of managers and 
supervisors. The ILO definition of manager or supervisor is 
quite narrow, whereas the NLRA broadly defines supervisors.
 
43 
The Supreme Court has interpreted the NLRA to exclude su-
pervisors and managerial employees from coverage.44 Under the 
NLRA a supervisor may join a union consisting of rank-and-file 
employees, or other supervisors, but has no legal right to organ-
ize and bargain collectively.45
 
 40. ILO DIGEST, supra note 
 The ILO does not exclude super-
visors and managerial employees from coverage and protection. 
35, ¶ 218 (stating that a distinction in union 
matters between public and private employees is inequitable). The two narrow 
exclusions from ILO coverage are public employees directly engaged in the 
administration of the state and officials acting as supporting elements, and 
essential public services. See id. ¶ 887. 
 41. See NLRA § 152; see also National Labor Relations Act, NAT’L LAB. 
REL. BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov/national-labor-relations-act (last visited Apr. 
1, 2014) (excluding “any individual employed as an agricultural laborer” and 
“any individual having the status of an independent contractor” from the stat-
utory definition of employee); Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., 107th Sess. 
Mar. 11–28, 2013, U.N. Doc, available at http://archive.constantcontact.com/ 
fs128/1102969153793/archive/1112745186592.html (finding that the United 
States is in violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights for failing to extend the right to organize to all individuals, including 
non-statutorily defined employees such as agricultural workers). 
 42. As of 2010, only 37.4% of public workers in the United States were un-
ionized. Mark Schneider, Ellen Bronchetti & Trent Sutton, The Financial Cri-
sis: Ruin or Restoration of the Labor Movement?, 2 EMP. & INDUS. REL. L. 
NEWSL. 18 (2010). 
 43. Compare ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 248 (stating that the definition 
of supervisors “should be limited to cover only those persons who genuinely 
represent the interests of employers”), with NLRA § 152 (stating that any in-
dividual with authority, in the employer’s interest, “to hire, transfer, suspend, 
lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employ-
ees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively 
to recommend such action” when doing so is “not of a merely routine or clerical 
nature”).  
 44. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111 (1944); Phelps Dodge 
Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941); see also NLRA § 152. 
 45. See ROBERT A. GORMAN & MATTHEW W. FINKIN, LABOR LAW ANALY-
SIS AND ADVOCACY 42–44 (2013).  
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Furthermore, such employees have the right to join a union 
consisting of rank-and-file workers.46
2. Elections 
 
ILO standards for selecting a bargaining representative 
provide full freedom to establish and join unions.47 U.S. labor 
law mandates a system of exclusive representation, in conform-
ity with ILO standards.48 The ILO requires that minority un-
ions are allowed to function, speak on behalf of their members, 
and represent members regarding individual grievances.49 U.S. 
minority unions do not have such extensive rights, since the 
ability to represent and speak on behalf of their members may 
undermine the U.S. principle of exclusive representation.50 The 
ILO states that minority unions in the U.S. do not need to be 
recognized if an exclusive representative has been legitimately 
selected or certified.51 In the absence of a majority union, how-
ever, the ILO states that a minority union must be recognized.52
The NLRB, following a representation election, may either 
formally certify exclusive representation in the United States 
or a union may be informally recognized by an employer.
 
53 Both 
formal and informal certification is permissible under ILO 
standards so long as an independent and impartial body (such 
as the NLRB) verifies the union’s majority status.54
 
 46. See ILO DIGEST, supra note 
 A U.S. em-
35, ¶ 247. 
 47. See id. ¶ 309. 
 48. NLRA § 159; see ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 950. A system for de-
termining the exclusive representative must be based on precise and objective 
pre-established criteria. See id. ¶ 962. 
 49. ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶¶ 359, 974. Minority unions are those in 
an exclusive representation system that failed to gain enough votes to become 
the exclusive representative. Id. ILO standards protect workers involved that 
wish to belong to a minority union, and allow the employees to be represented 
by the minority union during grievance proceedings. See id. ¶ 975. 
 50. See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 330–34. A majority union 
may allow an employer to process a grievance with a minority union, but if the 
employer proceeds to adjust a grievance without the majority union’s permis-
sion it is considered a violation of NLRA § 8(a)(5). See id. at 331–32. 
 51. See César F. Rosado Marzán, Labor’s Soft Means and Hard Challeng-
es: Fundamental Discrepancies and the Promise of Non-Binding Arbitration 
for International Framework Agreements, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1749 ( 2014). 
 52. Id. (stating that the U.S. system of exclusive representation arguably 
does not violate ILO norms favoring minority unions). 
 53. See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 76–80. 
 54. ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 351 (“Verification of the representative 
character of a union should a priori be carried out by an independent and im-
partial body.”); see also id. ¶¶ 925, 952–53 (citing the principle of free and vol-
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ployee or union may file a petition for a representation election 
upon a showing that 30% of the employees in the unit desire 
representation.55 A union must receive a majority of the votes 
cast by eligible voters in the bargaining unit during a secret 
ballot election.56 Under the ILO, showing of interest require-
ments, secret ballot elections, and a 30% threshold are all per-
missible procedures.57
The selection of an appropriate bargaining unit under the 
NLRA significantly affects union power. U.S. employers tend to 
prefer large units that include numerous trades and occupa-
tions, while unions often prefer smaller, more manageable 
units when seeking NLRB certification.
 
58 The NLRB deter-
mines the appropriateness of the unit using a community of in-
terest standard and places greater limitations on multi-
employer units than under ILO standards.59
 
untary negotiation, and that employers should recognize the organization as 
representative of the employees). 
 The ILO is flexible 
in determining an appropriate bargaining unit, essentially 
granting the union free determination of their structure and 
 55. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (2012). An employer may insist on an election 
despite a majority showing (generally accomplished by signed authorization 
cards). See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 55.  
 56. NLRA § 159. The NLRA provides for an election bar where no election 
may be conducted when a valid election had been held within the preceding 
twelve-month period. Id. Additionally, a contract-bar exists in the U.S. where 
the NLRB will dismiss an election petition filed during the term of a CBA that 
has a duration of less than three years. See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, 
at 72; ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 969 (stating that election bars are con-
sistent with ILO standards).  
 57. See ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶¶ 349, 356, 961, 969. 
 58. See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 97–98 (arguing that smaller 
units facilitate increased organization and effectiveness of the union in con-
ducting its activities, while larger units are more diversified, making conflicts 
of interest more likely, and additionally carrying a greater danger of a more 
massive work stoppage). Unions, however, currently prefer to seek voluntary 
recognition from an employer to NLRB certification. Marzán E-mail, supra 
note 32. Unions tend to prefer larger bargaining units when seeking such vol-
untary recognition. See id. (stating that while unions tend to prefer big units, 
it becomes harder to win an election with such units). 
 59. GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 102–03; see ILO DIGEST, supra 
note 35, ¶ 333 (establishing the freedom of choice of union structure). See also 
Issue Analysis: U.S. Ratification of ILO Core Labour Standards, U.S. COUNCIL 
FOR INT’L BUS. at 6 (Apr. 2007), http://www.uscib.org/docs/ilo_conventions_us_ 
ratification.pdf [hereinafter USCIB] (arguing that ratification of ILO Conven-
tion No. 87 would remove limitations on the formation of multiemployer 
units).  
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composition.60 Greater regulation and oversight surround the 
NLRA process for selecting a bargaining representative.61 The 
NLRB handles challenges to union elections under the NLRA, 
and only employers can seek indirect judicial review.62 ILO 
standards, however, provide that judicial authority should ex-
amine challenges.63
3. Interference with the Right to Organize 
 
International labor law emphasizes the principle of non-
interference with the right to organize.64 ILO Convention No. 
98 calls for union freedom from employer and rival union inter-
ference in pursuing their activities.65 In violation of this princi-
ple, U.S. labor law imposes considerable limitations on union 
campaigning, solicitation, distribution of union material, and 
access to company property.66
 
 60. See ILO DIGEST, supra note 
 Unless U.S. employees live on the 
property, an employer may deny union access to the work-
35, ¶ 333 (“The free exercise of the right 
to establish and join unions implies the free determination of the structure 
and composition of unions.”). 
 61. Compare id. ¶ 333 (citing the principle of free determination of the 
structure of unions), with NLRA § 159 (granting the NLRB power to deter-
mine and approve an appropriate bargaining unit).  
 62. See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 91 (stating that the NLRA 
does not contain an express provision for direct judicial review of NLRB repre-
sentation proceeding decisions—a review of representation proceedings may 
only arise from an unfair labor practice charge). 
 63. ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 440 (arguing that challenges to union 
elections should be examined by judicial authorities). 
 64. Id. ¶ 855. 
 65. See ILO Convention No. 98, supra note 14, at art. 2; ILO DIGEST, su-
pra note 35, ¶¶ 855, 858 (including interference during the organization pro-
cess). One area where the United States is in compliance with ILO standards 
is employee privacy rights—both the ILO and the United States protect and 
limit employer disclosure of information on union membership and activities. 
See id. ¶¶ 177, 478 (expressing concern that keeping a register with data re-
garding union remembers disrespects privacy rights); Alvin L. Goldman & 
Roberto L. Corrada, United States of America, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLO-
PAEDIA FOR LABOUR LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 146–48 (Jan. 2010), 
available at www.kluwerlawonline.com/toc.php?pubcode=IELL (explaining 
state privacy law limitations on employer’s concerning their employees). 
 66. See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 275, 279, 291–96 (discussing 
an employer’s ability to prohibit union solicitation during work time, “no-
distribution” rules in working areas, and communication imbalances in favor 
of the employer in that denial of “equal time” to unions is presumed lawful and 
that a union lacks the ability to conduct a “captive audience speech”); see also 
Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 252–56 (discussing and providing ex-
amples of solicitation, distribution, campaign, and access restrictions). 
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place.67 Under ILO standards, unions generally have access to 
the workplace.68 U.S. employers may also restrict union solici-
tation during work time, as well as distribution of union mate-
rial in the workplace.69
Due to the amount of employer interference allowable un-
der U.S. law, U.S. employers enjoy significantly more opportu-
nities to communicate with workers about the consequences of 
unionization as compared with unions campaigning about the 
benefits of collective representation.
  
70 The U.S. communication 
imbalance violates ILO standards and provides U.S. employers 
with an advantage throughout the organization process.71
Anti-union campaigns during an organization effort are the 
most visible example of interference allowed by the NLRA.
  
72 By 
permitting anti-union campaigns, U.S. law does not comply 
with ILO freedom of association and non-interference princi-
ples.73 The United States is exceptional among ILO member 
states in permitting anti-union campaigns.74
 
 67. See Goldman & Corrada, supra note 
 If the United 
65, at 254–55 (describing the U.S. 
standard for union access to the workplace as whether reasonable efforts per-
mit union access to workers in another fashion, or off premises access to the 
employees is nearly impossible). 
 68. ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶¶ 1102–04. The ILO standard for union 
access to company property: union access may not impair efficient operation of 
the employer, and must observe due respect for property and management 
rights. Id. ¶¶ 1103, 1109. 
 69. See Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 254–55. 
 70. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2012); see NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 
U.S. 575, 618 (1969) (holding that employers can communicate general views 
on collective bargaining, but are not free to threaten employers or promise 
benefits); GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 175; Goldman & Corrada, su-
pra note 65, at 223–25. 
 71. See ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, Complaint Against the 
United States, Case No. 1523, Report No. 284 (1992); Int’l Trade Union Con-
federation, Free Speech and Freedom of Association: Finding the Balance, at 
9–10 (June 2013) [hereinafter ITUC, Free Speech] (arguing that the extent of 
U.S. employer free speech rights that interfere with organization, but are law-
ful per the NLRA, violate ILO standards); see also File No. 25476-09-12 Na-
tional Labour Court of Israel (Histadrut), Pelephone Communications LTD 
(2013), cited by Int’l Trade Union Confederation, Free Speech and Freedom of 
Association: Finding the Balance, at 9–10 (June 2013) (providing a potential 
middle ground solution for respecting both employer free speech and employee 
freedom of association rights, distinguishing between employer speech while 
workers are attempting to organize a union, and the period after workers have 
gained collective bargaining rights). 
 72. See also ITUC, Free Speech, supra note 71 (discussing the anti-union 
campaign tactics permitted by U.S. labor law). 
 73. Id. at 9–10.  
 74. Id. at 116. 
  
2014] INTERNATIONAL LABOR COMPLIANCE 1853 
 
States were to ratify ILO Convention No. 87, the results would 
be significant; employer free speech provisions and employer 
rights to oppose unions would be substantially curtailed.75
The ILO recognizes employer freedom of expression but 
holds that such expression cannot interfere with employees’ 
freedom-of-association rights.
  
76 The rights of employer freedom 
of expression and employee freedom of association are meant to 
be complementary, and not in conflict with one another.77 Cur-
rently, U.S. labor law allows various forms of employer inter-
ference rarely seen in other ILO member states, such as captive 
audience meetings and one-on-one meetings with supervisors.78
 
 75. See id. at 9–10 (discussing how the USCIB concedes that U.S. law 
permitting anti-union campaigning violates ILO Convention No. 87’s principle 
of non-interference); see also USCIB, supra note 
 
A recent dispute that arose from an attempt by Delta flight at-
59, at 5–6 (arguing that rati-
fication would conflict with NLRA § 8(e) hot cargo agreement restrictions, lim-
it restrictions on the right to strike, and prohibit virtually all acts of employer 
interference in organizing). Arguably, the United States is bound by the prin-
ciples of ILO Convention No. 87 due to its membership in the ILO and the du-
ties imposed by the 1998 Declaration. See Marzán E-mail, supra note 32. 
While the U.S. may not be bound to the same procedures as member states 
that have ratified ILO Convention No. 87, the United States must still meet 
certain reporting requirements. See id. 
 76. See ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, Complaint Against the 
United States, Report in Which the Committee Requests to be Kept Informed 
of Development, Report No. 357, Case No. 2683, ¶ 584 (June 2010) [hereinaf-
ter Delta] (stating that employer freedom of expression may not be aimed at 
eliminating an employee’s freedom of association rights and ability to exercise 
their free choice during a union campaign); ITUC, Free Speech, supra note 71, 
at 19 (“[E]mployers have freedom of speech, but they cannot abuse freedom of 
speech in ways that interfere with workers’ freedom of association and organ-
ising.”). 
 77. ITUC, Free Speech, supra note 71, at 19. An example of expression 
crossing the line can be seen in ILO CFA Case No. 1852 (U.K.), stating that 
persuasion crosses the line into interference when it unduly influences, and 
that posting of notice suggesting to employees not to get involved in a rally 
could be understood as a threat that amounts to undue influence. See ILO 
Committee on Freedom of Association, Report in Which the Committee Re-
quests to be Kept Informed of Development, Report No. 309, Case No. 1852,  
¶ 340 (July 1998) (holding that the CFA considers the posting of notice at 
work by an employer suggesting employees stay out of a rally “could be under-
stood as a threat . . . not to exercise their trade union rights” and constitutes 
undue influence). 
 78. See ITUC, Free Speech, supra note 71, at 1619 (arguing that captive-
audience meetings are unheard of in most countries, and are viewed as an af-
front to workers’ privacy, dignity, and autonomy); see also id. at 14–16 (provid-
ing an example of Deutsche Telekom and T-Mobile urging managers to imme-
diately launch anti-union campaigns whenever union organizers attempted to 
communicate with employees, and utilizing anti-campaign tactics such as 
mandatory meetings, supervisor meetings, and spying on union activity). 
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tendants to unionize demonstrates the inconsistency between 
U.S. and ILO standards.79 Delta utilized aggressive anti-union 
tactics to prevent unionization, as permitted under the Railway 
Labor Act.80 After the union complained to the ILO, the Com-
mittee on Freedom of Association (CFA)81 expressed concern 
over Delta’s active campaigning to prevent unionization, par-
ticularly through the distribution of “shred-it” buttons and fly-
ers.82 According to the CFA, active interference with any em-
ployee exercising free choice violates the principle of freedom of 
association.83
4. Approach to Public Employees 
 
Under ILO standards, public employees are treated the 
same as private employees, with few exceptions.84 The ILO 
guarantees the right to freedom of association without discrim-
ination of any kind to public service employees, firefighters, 
and teachers, as well as agricultural and plantation workers, 
and temporary workers.85
 
 79. Delta, supra note 
 Furthermore, ILO standards permit 
76; see ITUC, Free Speech, supra note 71, at 5–7 
(“American management-style anti-union tactics are not in conformity with 
ILO jurisprudence.”). 
 80. Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151−52 (2012); see also Delta, supra 
note 76, ¶ 590 (requesting the United States to review the RLA in light of the 
issues raised in the Delta case). 
 81. Formed in 1951, the Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) ex-
amines complaints alleging freedom of association infringement. Complaints 
are examined regardless of whether the relevant member states have ratified 
the convention(s) at issue. The CFA may recommend to the Governing Body 
that the Governing Body should draw the attention of the government at issue 
to the problems presented in the complaint. The CFA has a mandate to im-
prove working conditions, contribute to the effectiveness and principles of 
freedom of association, and to promote the freedom of association. Additional-
ly, the CFA determines member state compliance with principles of freedom of 
association as laid out in the ILO Constitution and conventions. Committee on 
Freedom of Association, ILO, http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/applying 
-and-promoting-international-labour-standards/committee-on-freedom-of 
-association/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2014).  
 82. Delta management encouraged employees to shred their ballots. Due 
to the RLA election procedures at the time, a non-vote counted as a no vote. 
Delta, supra note 76, ¶¶ 438, 582. 
 83. Id. ¶ 584. 
 84. ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 218 (considering the denial of freedom to 
organize to public servants as inequitable). The main narrow exception to ILO 
public employee coverage is public employees directly engaged in the admin-
istration of the state and officials acting as supporting elements. Id. ¶ 887. 
 85. Id. The key language that distinguishes ILO treatment from U.S. 
treatment (in allowing the inclusion of public service employees) is “without 
discrimination of any kind.” See id. ¶ 209. 
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public employee organizations to affiliate with federations and 
confederations of workers in the private sector.86
In the United States, public employees are excluded from 
NLRA coverage.
 
87 State and federal laws, however, can protect 
public employees. The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 governs 
federal workers.88 The Civil Service Reform Act protects em-
ployee rights to join unions, regulates election procedures, and 
establishes the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA).89 
Federal laws exclude supervisors and managers, while reserv-
ing the right of management to select, direct, and discipline its 
workforce.90 Unlike the NLRA, federal administrative agencies 
are not required to provide the FLRA with the names and ad-
dresses of all employees eligible to vote in the bargaining 
unit—thus inhibiting efforts to organize the workers.91
Most government employees were not permitted to organ-
ize until the late 1960s.
  
92 Now, 36 states and Washington D.C. 
permit at least some public employee collective representation, 
often based on the NLRA model of exclusive representation.93 
Many states, however, limit the right to collectively organize 
and bargain to particular groups of public employees and par-
ticular subject matters.94
 
 86. Id. ¶ 725 (permitting affiliation if private sector rules and regulations 
allow it). 
 Moreover, a few states have either ex-
 87. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2012). 
 88. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7106, 7111–7123, 
7131–7135 (2012). See Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 341 (discussing 
how the Reform Act protects the rights of federal government employees). 
 89. Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 341. The Federal Labor Rela-
tions Authority (FLRA) determines whether a union should be established on 
an agency, plant, installation, functional or other basis. Id. at 353. Additional-
ly, the FLRA determines whether a bargaining unit ensures the fullest free-
dom in exercising employee rights, and whether a unit will ensure a clear and 
identifiable community of interest. The FLRA is charged with implementing 
the rights and responsibilities created by the act. Id. at 341, 353. 
 90. Id. at 341–42. 
 91. See id. at 341 (explaining that “Privacy Act exceptions to the Freedom 
of Information Act” prevent federal agencies from providing the “home ad-
dresses of the employees in the bargaining unit”). Under the NLRA, an em-
ployer must provide this information to the regional director within seven 
days after an election date is determined. GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 
69 (describing the Excelsior List of Eligible Voters). 
 92. Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 338. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See, e.g., Indiana Senate Enrolled Act No. 575 (2011) (limiting the 
scope of bargaining for teachers to wages and benefits); S.B. 98 §§ 5–6, 2011 
Leg., 76th Sess. (Nev. 2011) (reducing the number of public employee supervi-
sors able to collectively bargain). 
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pressly prohibited the collective organization of public employ-
ees, or have no statute either granting or denying such rights.95 
Separate labor laws govern a number of different occupations. 
Federal postal workers are governed by the Postal Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1970;96 and teachers, police, and firefighters may be 
covered by separate state labor laws.97
Of the total amount of state and local employees in the 
United States, over one-third are covered by collective bargain-
ing agreements (CBA).
 
98 Bargaining unit boundaries for state 
and local employees tend to be imposed by statute and some by 
government structural design—both inconsistent with ILO 
standards.99 States take diverse approaches to the organiza-
tional rights of their employees, which in itself is an obstacle 
for U.S. labor law to comply with ILO standards.100
B. THE RIGHT TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY 
 
The ILO views the right to bargain freely with employers 
to address conditions of work as an essential element of free-
dom of association.101
 
 95. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 40.1−57.2 (2010) (prohibiting a public em-
ployer from entering into a collective bargaining agreement).  
 ILO standards tend to provide greater 
protection of the right to bargain collectively than U.S. labor 
 96. Postal Reorganization Act of 1970, 39 U.S.C. §§ 1004, 1201–1209 
(2012). Those without management or supervisory functions have the same 
organizational rights as those in the private sector. Goldman & Corrada, su-
pra note 65, at 340. 
 97. Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 353. 
 98. Id. at 338 (stating that over three times the amount of employees are 
covered than in the private sector). 
 99. See id. at 352–53 (discussing bargaining unit boundaries for state and 
local employees). Under ILO standards, employees have the right to free de-
termination of the structure and composition of their union. Imposing bargain-
ing unit boundaries runs against the ILO free determination principle. See 
ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 333 (“The free exercise of the right to establish 
and join unions implies the free determination of the structure and composi-
tion of unions.”). 
 100. The United States is concerned that ratification of ILO Convention 
No. 98 would infringe on a state’s Tenth Amendment right to determine the 
terms and conditions of employment for their employees. USCIB, supra note 
59, at 7.  
 101. Following the lead of the ILO, the European Court on Human Rights 
recently held that the right to bargain collectively is inherent in the right to 
freedom of association guaranteed by Article 11 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights. Demir & Baykara v. Turkey, No. 34503/97, §§ 153–54 (Nov. 
12, 2008), discussed by Antoine Jacobs, Article 11 ECHR: The Right to Bargain 
Collectively, in THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE EM-
PLOYMENT RELATION 309, 312, 315−17 (Filip Dorssemont et al. eds., 2013). 
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law.102 Noticeable differences exist concerning the duty to bar-
gain in good faith, mandatory and non-mandatory subjects cov-
ered by a CBA, and treatment of public employees.103
1. Duty to Bargain in Good Faith 
 
ILO and U.S. standards provide for a duty to bargain in 
good faith.104 Employer economic inducements to give up bar-
gaining rights, employer dominated unions, and employer as-
sistance to unions (financial or otherwise) violate the duty to 
bargain in good faith under U.S. and ILO standards.105 Both the 
ILO and United States permit unions to bring representatives 
from other unions or bargaining units to CBA negotiations.106
Under ILO standards, failure to implement a CBA violates 
the duty to bargain in good faith and the right to bargain col-
lectively.
 
107 By contrast, U.S. employers are only obligated to 
meet and confer in good faith but are not required to come to an 
agreement.108 Additionally, labor law does not prohibit a U.S. 
employer from unilaterally cancelling non-mandatory subjects 
during a current bargaining agreement—although such chang-
es may violate the parties’ collective bargaining agreement.109
 
 102. Jacobs, supra note 
 
101, at 318. 
 103. Id. at 326–28. 
 104. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2012); ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶¶ 934–
43. Absent union representation, U.S. employers have broad discretion to dis-
charge employees due to the at-will doctrine. See Goldman & Corrada, supra 
note 65, at 98–108 (discussing the at-will employment doctrine and the few 
limitations that apply to employers). All other ILO member states only permit 
dismissal of employees for just cause. See ITUC, Free Speech, supra note 71, at 
14 (“In every other country in the world, including Anglo-Saxon countries with 
similar legal traditions, employers must demonstrate ‘just cause’ to dismiss an 
employee.”). Several European states, including France, Luxembourg, the Slo-
vak Republic, and Bulgaria, also obligate employers to bargain with unions. 
Jacobs, supra note 101, at 326. 
 105. See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 196–206; ILO DIGEST, supra 
note 35, ¶¶ 858, 1058.  
 106. GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 539–40; ILO DIGEST, supra note 
35, ¶¶ 984–87. 
 107. ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 943; see Marzán E-mail, supra note 32. 
It is important to note that while neither the United States nor the ILO tech-
nically compel parties to come to a collective bargaining agreement, failure to 
reach an agreement under ILO standards may be considered a violation of the 
duty to bargain in good faith. More information would be needed to determine 
whether there was a lack of good faith and on the part of whom. Failure to 
reach an agreement under U.S. law is not generally considered a violation. Id.  
 108. NLRA § 158(d). 
 109. See Allied Chem. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 187–88 
(1971) (holding that while a mid-term unilateral modification by an employer 
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The ILO prohibits employers from unilaterally canceling any 
bargaining agreement rights—mandatory or not.110 In the Unit-
ed States, an employer may elect to go out of business instead 
of dealing with a union, as long as the motivation behind the 
closure is not to chill unionization elsewhere.111 Unlike the 
United States, closure of a business does not in itself result in 
the extinction of existing CBA obligations under the ILO.112
ILO standards emphasize the principle of free and volun-
tary negotiations and the autonomy of bargaining partners.
 
113 
As a result, less outside interference occurs during the bargain-
ing process than in the United States.114 The ILO stresses that 
any unjustified delay by an employer in holding negotiations 
should be avoided.115
 
may amount to a breach of contract, such modification only violates 8(a)(5) if 
the provision is a mandatory subject of bargaining); Goldman & Corrada, su-
pra note 
 U.S. employers, however, often delay bar-
65, at 328 (“If a topic is a permissive subject of bargaining, a unilat-
eral change can be made with regard to that subject without committing an 
unfair labor practice.”).  
 110. See ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 942 (“A legal provision which allows 
the employer to modify unilaterally the content of signed collective agree-
ments, or to require that they be renegotiated, is contrary to the principles of 
collective bargaining.”). 
 111. See Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 232 (stating that the Su-
preme Court views the choice to go out of business as a property right, and 
employers may go out of business “to avoid having to deal with” unionization); 
see also Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 
275 (1965) (holding that a partial closing only amounts to an unfair labor 
practice if motivated by a desire to “chill unionism in any of the remaining 
plants of the single employer”).  
 112. See ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 1059 (“The closing of an enterprise 
should not in itself result in the extinction of the obligations resulting from the 
collective agreement.”). 
 113. ILO Convention No. 98, supra note 14; ILO DIGEST, supra note 35,  
¶¶ 881, 925. 
 114. For example, ILO standards only allow member states to implement 
rules to facilitate negotiations and promote collective bargaining. Intervention 
during an impasse is only permitted if both parties approve, and the ILO is 
against imposing compulsory arbitration if no CBA has been reached. See ILO 
DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶¶ 933, 992–97. By contrast, in the United States the 
NLRB has the power to issue bargaining orders. See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra 
note 45, at 135−36 (citing NLRB v. Gissel Packi ng Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969)) 
(describing the NLRB’s broad discretion to issue a bargaining order when a 
cease and desist order may not suffice). Additionally, U.S. labor law permits 
the use of economic weapons in the bargaining context. Goldman & Corrada, 
supra note 65, at 328; see GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 585 (discussing 
the Supreme Court’s endorsement of the “lesser” pressure of reduced pay as 
par of economic pressure exerted outside of formal bargaining). 
 115. ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 937. 
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gaining in an effort to avoid unionization.116 While a union or 
employee may file a refusal to bargain charge with the NLRB, 
the economic incentives for U.S. employers to delay bargaining 
arguably outweigh the costs.117 Because the complaint proce-
dure takes an extensive amount of time, employee support for 
unionization may substantially decrease throughout the pro-
cess.118 Absent a make-whole or punitive remedy, U.S. employ-
ers face no significant deterrent from delaying the bargaining 
process.119
Under U.S. law, unions retain a rebuttable presumption of 
majority status.
 
120
 
 116. See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (2000) (hold-
ing that an employer who engages in a lockout during the bargaining process 
does not engage in an unfair labor practice); Horsehead Res. Dev. Co. v. 
NLRB, 154 F.3d 328, 339–40 (6th Cir. 1998) (reversing the NLRB by holding 
that an employer’s tactic of delaying meetings and “wage offer” until near the 
end of an expiring agreement are allowable as “hard bargaining”). 
 A number of ways exist for employers and 
 117. A refusal to bargain charge may be filed per 8(a)(5) under the NLRA 
by either a union or an employee in the bargaining unit seeking recognition. 
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 160(b) (2012). The eventual court enforcement 
of an NLRB cease and desist or bargaining order is unlikely to deter employ-
ers determined to delay the bargaining process in order to avoid the costs of 
unionization due to the lengthy NLRB and subsequent court review process, a 
loss of employee support for unionization may occur, making unionization fol-
lowing the review process less likely to occur. See William B. Gould IV, The 
Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, Labor Law Reform, and What Can Be Done 
About the Broken System of Labor-Management Relations Law in the United 
States, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 291, 298–99 (2008) (discussing how employer can ex-
ploit delays in NLRB proceedings, in part due to ineffective remedies, during 
which employees may lose interest in unionization and the bargaining pro-
cess); see also Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107, 108 (1970) (holding that the 
NLRA does not provide for lost compensation attributable to an employer’s de-
lay during the NLRB process). 
 118. Gould, supra note 117, at 298–99, 306 (discussing how it is less costly 
for employers to delay, rather than negotiate, when employee support for un-
ionization wanes).  
 119. See id. (citing a “remedy crisis,” in that the current available remedies 
only affect the individual, “as opposed to the collective interests of union rep-
resentation”). The CFA has said that when reinstatement is not possible, the 
dismissed employees should be given a make-whole remedy. ILO DIGEST, su-
pra note 35, ¶ 843. Employees should be adequately compensated and such 
compensation should take into account both the damage incurred and the need 
to prevent the repetition of such situations in the future. See id. ¶ 844. 
 120. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 778 (1990); 
see also GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 152–59 (discussing three scenar-
ios where the incumbent union maintains a conclusive presumption of majori-
ty support, including one year after certification, for a reasonable time after a 
union secures bargaining rights through informal employer recognition, and 
during a labor agreement); Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 442 (stating 
that when dealing with an incumbent union, an employer must show by objec-
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rival unions to challenge the incumbent’s representative status, 
including filing a decertification petition,121 an election peti-
tion,122 or an employer refusal to bargain.123 The loss of recogni-
tion as the exclusive union representative may result from an 
NLRB decision. ILO standards for exclusive representation 
permit administrative authorities to evaluate the representa-
tive status of an incumbent union on the basis of “objective and 
pre-established criteria.”124 Nonetheless, the ILO prefers a de-
termination on the loss of recognition as an exclusive repre-
sentative to come from the judiciary.125
2. Subjects Covered by a Collective Bargaining Agreement  
  
The ILO defines subjects covered by collective bargaining 
as “matters . . . primarily or essentially . . . relating to condi-
tions of employment” including wages, benefits, hours, and 
 
tive evidence that it is uncertain the incumbent continues to enjoy majority 
support). 
 121. See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 78–81 (stating that employ-
ees in the union may file a petition seeking to decertify the existing union up-
on a 30% showing of interest (the process is nearly identical to a normal repre-
sentation election)). 
 122. See id. at 63–66 (stating that the Wagner Act extended the right to 
employers to file an election petition if there is uncertainty that the union still 
has majority support). 
 123. Since representation petitions are not subject to direct judicial review, 
employers often refuse to bargain in order to instigate an 8(a)(5) refusal to 
bargain charge. See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 73–78 (discussing 
how an employer seeking judicial review of a NLRB determination on an elec-
tion matter will simply refuse to bargain, and attempt to have the inevitable 
unfair labor practice determination set aside due to “error in the representa-
tion proceeding”). The NLRA provides for judicial review of unfair labor prac-
tices orders, and under this procedure employers are allowed to challenge rep-
resentation issues. See NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2006). 
 124. ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 347. 
 125. See id. ¶ 440 (discussing how measures taken by administrative agen-
cies regarding challenged election results “run the risk of being arbitrary” and 
that “matters of this kind should be examined by the judicial authorities”); cf. 
id. ¶ 687 (“Cancellation of a trade union’s registration should only be possible 
through judicial channels.”). In the United States, NLRB certification is only 
required for a union to compel an employer to bargain in good faith, but certi-
fication is not required for the union to bargain on a voluntary basis or enjoy 
other types of legal recognition. See Marzán E-Mail, supra note 32. In certain 
other ILO member states, judicial registration is necessary for any type of le-
gal recognition. See id. Hence, a judicial role for certification in the United 
States remains unnecessary. Id. If U.S. courts were required to certify unions, 
it would take a significant amount of time for new unions to become certified. 
Id. The current U.S. policy of keeping recognition within the province of the 
NLRB helps to facilitate speedy union organization. Id. 
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leaves.126 Unlike U.S. law, ILO standards do not distinguish be-
tween mandatory and non-mandatory subjects of bargaining 
because of the right of unions freely to negotiate their working 
conditions with the employer.127
The NLRA requires U.S. employers to bargain over manda-
tory subjects of employment, including wages, hours, and other 
conditions of employment that are almost exclusively an aspect 
of the employer-employee relationship.
  
128 When a subject is 
non-mandatory either party can refuse to discuss the matter, 
and the other party may not insist upon bargaining over it.129 
Non-mandatory subjects typically fall into two groups: (1) sub-
jects that deal with an employer’s relationship to third parties 
and are “normally regarded as within the prerogative of man-
agement,” and (2) subjects that deal with the union and em-
ployee relationship and are “normally regarded as within the 
internal control of the union.”130
3. Approach to Public Employees 
 
Public employees under the ILO have essentially the same 
collective bargaining rights as private sector workers.131
 
 126. ILO DIGEST, supra note 
 Two 
narrow categories of ILO employees do not have the same col-
lective bargaining rights: public employees directly engaged in 
the administration of the state and officials acting as support-
35, ¶¶ 913, 920. 
 127. Compare ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶¶ 912–24 (making no mention 
of a mandatory and non-mandatory distinction), with NLRA §§ 158(a)(5), (d), 
159(a) (providing that rates of pay, wages, hours, and conditions of employ-
ment are mandatory subjects of bargaining and that an employer’s refusal to 
bargain on these subjects constitutes an unfair labor practice), and GORMAN & 
FINKIN, supra note 45, at 770 (explaining that mandatory subjects usually 
“regulate the relations between the employer and the employees”). The Su-
preme Court in NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 
(1958), divided bargaining proposals into three categories: (1) illegal provi-
sions, which may not be incorporated into a CBA, (2) mandatory provisions, 
which both parties must bargain in good faith over, and (3) non-mandatory, 
where either party may propose such a provision, but neither party is obligat-
ed to discuss it and neither party may insist upon the provision’s incorporation 
to a point of impasse. GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 771. 
 128. NLRA §§ 158(a)(5), (d), 159(a); see also GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 
45, at 771–74 (stating that the Supreme Court utilizes a balancing test to 
make the “mandatory-permissive distinction”). 
 129. GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 771. 
 130. Id. at 808. 
 131. See ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶¶ 881, 885–86 (discussing that ILO 
Convention No. 98 applies to public employees, and that the right to bargain 
freely makes up an “essential element in freedom of association”). 
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ing elements, and those providing essential public services.132 
The ILO precludes dismissal of employees within these two 
categories for union activity.133 Additionally, under ILO stand-
ards public employers are afforded greater flexibility in bar-
gaining than private employers.134
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, governing federal 
employees,
 
135 protects federal public employee job rights, and 
generally covers grounds for hiring and firing.136 Federal em-
ployees, however, cannot bargain about basic rights, including 
wages.137 The Act also defines the “bargaining and contract ad-
ministrative processes” for executive branch employees.138 The 
Federal Service Impasses Panel assists in solving bargaining 
impasse disputes, conducts hearings, and imposes resolu-
tions.139
Collective bargaining agreements of U.S. federal employees 
generally provide substantive and procedural safeguards for 
employment.
 As a result, U.S. federal employees and unions face 
greater outside interference by administrative agencies than 
their ILO counterparts.  
140
 
 132. Id. ¶ 887. 
 Tensions exist between U.S. civil service laws 
 133. See id. ¶ 792 (“[T]he exercise of the right to freely remove public em-
ployees from their posts should in no instance be motivated by the trade union 
functions or activities of the persons . . . .”). 
 134. See id. ¶ 1042 (explaining that while the “principle of the autonomy” 
in collective bargaining remains valid in the public sector, public employers 
should be afforded “a certain degree of flexibility”). 
 135. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7106, 7111–7123, 
7131–7135 (2012); Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 341. Contrary to 
ILO standards, the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 mandates that a CBA in-
clude “a grievance procedure with binding arbitration as a final step” that can 
be invoked by either party. Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 489. 
 136. Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65 at 341–43 (protecting the right of 
federal employees to organize and bargain collectively, implementing a system 
of exclusive representation, and providing representation in grievance and 
disciplinary proceedings). 
 137. Id. at 342. 
 138. Id. at 341. 
 139. See id. at 488 (explaining that the Federal Service Impasses Panel is 
an administrative agency created by the Civil Service Reform Act that occu-
pies a similar role as the NLRB). Unlike the NLRB, however, the Federal Ser-
vice Impasses Panel’s resolutions are only advisory, not binding. Id.  
 140. The Federal Service Impasses Panel investigates unresolved impasse 
disputes, recommends procedures to resolve the dispute, and may assist the 
parties in resolution. Id. The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 requires collec-
tive bargaining agreements to include grievance procedures providing for 
binding arbitration. Id. at 489. The Act, however, prohibits work stoppages. 
Id. at 488. 
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and federal collective bargaining agreements. For example, 
bargaining by federal sector unions cannot affect wages.141 
Wage rates for most federal employees are established by stat-
utory schedule.142 To comply with ILO standards, the ability for 
Congress to institute wage-price controls would be reduced.143 
The ILO permits wage-price controls only if done for “compel-
ling” national economic interests.144 The institution of such con-
trols for a prolonged period of time or over successive time peri-
ods violates ILO standards.145
U.S. adoption of the ILO approach to public employee col-
lective bargaining rights would essentially invalidate state and 
federal collective bargaining statutes.
 
146 Additionally, the scope 
of bargaining would expand in federal and other U.S. public 
sectors.147 The United States has expressed concern that com-
pliance with ILO standards would infringe the right of states to 
determine the terms and conditions of employment for their 
employees.148
C. THE RIGHT TO STRIKE 
 
The ILO considers the right to strike to be a fundamental 
union right, while U.S. labor law may restrict, or prohibit alto-
gether, the right to strike.149
 
 141. Id. at 342. 
 Appreciable differences exist be-
 142. See id. (“Because wage rates for most federal employees are estab-
lished by statutory schedules, bargaining cannot affect wages.”). 
 143. See USCIB, supra note 59, at 7. (“Convention 98 would prevent Con-
gress or the President from instituting wage-price controls for a prolonged pe-
riod of time or over successive periods of time.”). 
 144. See id. (“While the ILO’s supervisory bodies have allowed wage and 
price controls if they are established for compelling national economic inter-
ests . . . .”). 
 145. Id. 
 146. See id. at 5 (arguing that ratification of ILO Convention No. 87 can be 
construed as requiring the “eliminati[on of] state and federal collective bar-
gaining statutes for public employees”). 
 147. Id. at 7 (claiming that ratification of ILO Convention No. 98 would 
“expand the scope of bargaining in the federal sector and other public sector 
jurisdictions”). 
 148. Id. 
 149. ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 520 (regarding the right to strike as a 
fundamental right of employees and unions, but only when used to defend 
their economic and social interests); see also NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2012) 
(limiting a union’s ability to strike and classifying most secondary union activ-
ity as an unfair labor practice); Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 401 
(“Unlike many other legal systems, American law does not constitutionally 
protect the right to engage in a work stoppage. Rather, that right is estab-
lished by statute and is less than complete.”). Taking account of ILO practice, 
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tween the ILO and U.S. approaches, particularly in regard to 
protected strikes, picketing, replacement workers, limitations 
on the right to strike, and public employee work stoppages.  
1. Protected Strikes 
The ILO protects the right to strike as a way to defend un-
ion and employee occupational, social, and economic inter-
ests.150 Under ILO standards, “an acute national emergency” is 
the only time a blanket ban on strikes can be instituted.151 Un-
like the United States, the ILO does not restrict sympathy and 
recognition strikes.152 U.S. labor law protects unfair labor prac-
tice strikes,153 the majority of private sector economic strikes,154 
work preservation strikes,155 and certain organizational 
strikes.156
 
the European Court of Human Rights has recently held that a “clear-cut pro-
hibition of strikes” violates Article 11, as the right to strike is a “corollary 
right not to be dissociated from freedom of association.” Filip Dorssemont, The 
Right to Take Collective Action Under Article 11 ECHR, in THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION 333, 364 
(Filip Dorssemont et al. eds., 2013) (construing Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen v. Turkey, 
App. No. 68959/01 (Apr. 21, 2009)). 
 
 150. ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 526. 
 151. Id. ¶ 570 (“A general prohibition of strikes can only be justified in the 
event of an acute national emergency and for a limited period of time.”). 
 152. ILO standards permit sympathy strikes so long as the initial strike 
the workers are supporting is lawful. Id. ¶ 534. ILO standards view recogni-
tion strikes as “a legitimate interest which may be defended by workers and 
their organizations,” and consider a ban on such strikes to be “not in conformi-
ty with the principles of freedom of association.” Id. ¶¶ 535–36. Sympathy 
strikes are strikes in support of another bargaining unit or union on strike, 
while recognition strikes are strikes carried out by employees demanding 
recognition of a union. See generally GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 355–
79 (explaining that, in the United States, strikes with an objective of recogni-
tion or sympathy are considered an unfair labor practice if certain conditions 
are present). 
 153. See Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 259 (engaging in a strike to 
protest an unfair labor practice does not violate NLRA § 158(b)(7)). 
 154. Economic strikes are strikes over economic issues, like wages and 
benefits, and U.S. employers are permitted to permanently replace workers 
who engage in economic strikes. Lance Compa & Fred Feinstein, Enforcing 
European Corporate Commitments to Freedom of Association by Legal and In-
dustrial Action in the United States: Enforcement by Industrial Action, 33 
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 635, 636 (2012). 
 155. Work preservation strikes are done to preserve work currently being 
carried out by the employees in the bargaining unit, and are considered law-
ful. See Note, A Rational Approach to Secondary Boycotts and Work Preserva-
tion, 57 VA. L. REV. 1280, 1280 (1971). 
 156. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (2012). Organizational strikes can be-
come an unfair labor practice if: an employer has lawfully recognized another 
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Noticeable differences exist concerning the treatment of 
secondary union activity. ILO standards generally permit all 
forms of secondary activity and boycotts.157 The United States 
allows only a minimal amount of secondary union activity.158 
Peaceful, non-coercive requests to a U.S. secondary employer or 
employees thereof to stop dealing with the goods and services of 
the primary employer are permitted.159 In addition, a U.S. un-
ion may appeal to consumers to withhold purchasing the pri-
mary employer’s products or services.160 The NLRA largely pro-
hibits all other forms of secondary union activity.161
2. Picketing 
 
The ILO takes a more permissive approach to picketing 
than the United States, since its standards permit prohibitions 
only if the picketing “ceases to be peaceful.”162 In order to re-
main peaceful under ILO standards, picketing cannot “disturb[] 
public order and threaten[] workers who continued work.”163
 
union; a rival union strikes within the election bar period; the strike is done 
without an election petition being filed within a reasonable time; and the 
strike is against an already certified union. See Goldman & Corrada, supra 
note 
 
Picketing in the United States, even if it remains peaceful, may 
65, at 257–58. 
 157. The CFA holds that legislation should not restrict the inclusion of sec-
ondary boycott clauses in collective bargaining agreements. ILO DIGEST, su-
pra note 35, ¶ 915. Additionally, ILO standards provide that a ban on strikes 
unrelated to a dispute that employees or a union are not a party to (secondary 
union activity) violate the principles of freedom of association. See id. ¶ 538. 
 158. See NLRA § 158; GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 382 (consider-
ing secondary boycotts to be an unfair labor practice under the NLRA). Sec-
ondary boycotts occur when a union applies economic pressure on a third-
party employer that the union has no dispute with regarding its own terms of 
employment in order to induce the third-party employer to stop doing business 
with another employer with whom the union does have such a dispute. Id. at 
381. 
 159. See Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 267. The primary employer 
being the employer the union is striking against. Restrictions on this type of 
secondary activity still exist (Related Work Doctrine, Moore-Drydock test). See 
GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 399–402 (discussing the Moore-Drydock 
test). 
 160. Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 267. A union’s appeal to con-
sumers may not disrupt the secondary employer’s business. Id. 
 161. Generally, NLRA § 158(b)(4) allows direct economic pressure from a 
union against an employer that the union has a dispute with, but does not al-
low a union to put economic pressure on other employers. Id. at 266.  
 162. See ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 649. 
 163. Id. ¶ 650. 
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be enjoined to effectuate public policy.164 Under the ILO, mem-
ber states can require that pickets only be located near an em-
ployer—generally the only place permitted by U.S. labor law.165
The United States views picketing as a free speech right 
protected by the Constitution—as a result, blanket bans on 
picketing are prohibited.
 
166 The NLRA does, however, prohibit 
some recognitional picketing.167 U.S. labor law does permit 
picketing for economic and area standards purposes.168 While 
U.S. labor law prohibits picketing for publicity purposes 
against a neutral party, other concerted employee action for 
such purposes are considered legal.169
 
 164. See Goldman & Corrada, supra note 
  
65, at 264 (citing Giboney v. Em-
pire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949)). 
 165. ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 653; see GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 
45, at 387–88 (picketing on the property of the primary employer is considered 
the most appropriate place for appeals to primary employees to carry out a 
work stoppage). Picketing at a secondary site is usually prohibited by the 
NLRA, except where the secondary employer is considered an ally of the pri-
mary under the “ally doctrine,” or when the primary employer is working at 
the secondary employer’s business. GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 388–
99. 
 166. See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 345 (discussing how labor 
picketing is viewed as “speech plus” for constitutional purposes since it in-
volves more than pure discourse); Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 262, 
264 (stating that the Supreme Court has held that labor picketing is not con-
stitutionally protected under all circumstances, and that restraints on picket-
ing are often permitted by the Court despite the constitutional protections of 
freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, and speech).  
 167. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (2012). 
 168. Area standards picketing involves a union demanding an employer to 
pay employees comparable wages to other unions in the same area involved in 
a similar line of work. Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 259. 
 169. See Marzán E-mail, supra note 32. The Publicity Proviso, NLRA  
§ 158(b)(4), permits employees to appeal to the public to stop doing business 
with a neutral employer in order to get that employer to stop doing business 
with a primary employer with whom the employees have a labor dispute. See 
Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 268. Concerted employee action for 
publicity purposes, although legal, must be done through means other than 
picketing. See id. (explaining that the Publicity Proviso only permits public 
appeals “through means other than picketing”). For example, a union may dis-
tribute handbills outside of the site of a neutral employer requesting custom-
ers to refrain from purchasing the primary employer’s goods that are sold by 
the neutral employer. Id. at 267–68. Additionally, the Supreme Court has held 
that a union may ask a neutral employer in business with the primary em-
ployer to “cease doing such business for the duration of the labor-management 
dispute.” Id. at 267. 
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3. Replacement Workers 
Under ILO standards, when permanently replacing work-
ers exercising their right to strike, employers risk the relaxa-
tion of the right to strike and affect the exercise of union 
rights.170 ILO standards state that hiring replacement workers 
may inhibit the right to strike and freedom of association, and 
employers may not dismiss employees who choose to exercise 
their right to strike.171 Under U.S. law, employers may not 
permanently replace employees exercising their right to strike 
when the strike is protesting employer unfair labor practices.172 
U.S. employers may, however, hire permanent replacements 
and only offer reinstatement to former strikers as vacancies 
arise.173 Both the ILO and United States proscribe employers 
from granting benefits to strike replacements and employees 
who return to work.174
U.S. employees face a considerable risk when striking for 
economic purposes. While U.S. employers may not discharge 
employees engaged in an economic strike, the employers may 
hire replacement workers with no guarantee that the striking 
employees’ jobs will be available when the strike ends.
 
175 Fur-
thermore, a U.S. employer may, under certain circumstances, 
permanently replace an employee honoring a picket line in or-
der to preserve the efficient operation of business.176
 
 170. ILO DIGEST, supra note 
 Contrary 
to ILO standards, U.S. employers have the right to inform em-
35, ¶ 633; see also BERNARD GERNIGON ET AL., 
ILO PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE RIGHT TO STRIKE 46 (ILO ed., 2000) (ex-
plaining that the CFA believes hiring replacement workers is only justified 
under two circumstances: (1) during an illegal strike in an essential public 
service and (2) during acute national emergency). Additionally, the CFA con-
siders hiring permanent replacement workers to be a serious impairment of 
the right to strike. Id. at 47. 
 171. See ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶¶ 661, 663. 
 172. Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 406. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 675 (discussing discrimination in 
favor of non-strikers); GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 544–63 (reviewing 
the unlawful discrimination that results from disparate treatment of strikers 
and nonstrikers). 
 175. See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 532–33 (citing NLRB v. 
Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938) (holding that an employer can 
lawfully and permanently replace an employee engaged in an economic 
strike)). 
 176. The NLRB tends to treat an employee who refuses to cross a picket 
line similarly to an economic striker. See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 
355–80. An employee’s right to refuse to cross a “stranger’s” picket line, how-
ever, would be protected under the NLRA. See Marzán E-mail, supra note 32. 
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ployees during the bargaining process that if a union forces a 
strike, the employer will hire permanent replacements.177
4. Limitations on the Right to Strike 
 
ILO Convention No. 87 prohibits nearly all restrictions on 
the right to strike.178 ILO standards only permit member states 
to restrict strikes (1) of a purely political nature,179 (2) by work-
ers in essential service areas,180 (3) by public workers exercising 
authority in the name of a state,181 (4) during “an acute national 
emergency,”182 and (5) affecting minimum safety and occupa-
tional services.183
Collective bargaining agreements in the United States 
generally contain some form of a no-strike clause.
  
184 Moreover, 
when a collective bargaining agreement does not include a no-
strike clause, one may be inferred for bargaining subjects cov-
ered by compulsory arbitration.185
 
 177. ITUC, Free Speech, supra note 
 Under the NLRA, a U.S. 
court may enjoin a strike when the strike is over a grievance 
71, at 12. 
 178. ILO Convention No. 87, supra note 13. While neither Convention No. 
87 nor No. 98 mentions or guarantees a right to strike, the CFA stated as ear-
ly as 1952 that the right to strike is an essential union right and that a gen-
eral prohibition on the right to strike runs counter to Convention No. 87. See, 
e.g., Janice R. Bellace, The ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work, 17 INT’L J. COMP. LAB. L. & INDUS. REL. 269, 276 (2001); see 
also ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 523.  
 179. ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 528. 
 180. Id. ¶ 581 (providing that in order to be considered an essential service 
area, “the existence of a clear and imminent threat to the life, personal safety 
or health of the whole or part of the population” must be established). 
 181. Id. ¶ 574. 
 182. Id. ¶ 570. 
 183. Id. ¶ 606 (establishing minimum services during a strike action 
should be limited to services where the interruption would “endanger the life, 
personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population,” nonessential 
services that may result in an acute national crisis as a result of the extent 
and duration of the strike, or “public services of fundamental importance”). 
 184. See Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 414 (giving the employer 
the ability to lawfully fire an employee for breaching a no-strike clause). Most 
collective bargaining agreements contain a clause that prevents work stoppag-
es and economic pressure during the existence of the CBA, and most of the col-
lective bargaining agreements that do not include no-strike clauses only per-
mit strikes under limited circumstances. Id. at 388. 
 185. See id. at 414 (“However, a peace provision will also be found by impli-
cation to the extent that there is an express undertaking to resort to arbitra-
tion . . . as the exclusive means for resolving disputes.”). Express and implicit 
no-strike clauses are acceptable in collective agreements under the ILO so 
long as the collective agreement had been freely negotiated. See ILO DIGEST, 
supra note 35, ¶¶ 533, 881. 
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the parties are bound to arbitrate.186 U.S. labor laws also re-
strict most recognitional strikes, strikes that occur during the 
insulated period prior to the expiration of a CBA, and hot cargo 
agreements.187 By contrast, ILO standards view the right to 
strike as a natural “corollary to the right to organize.”188
If the United States were to ratify ILO Convention No. 87, 
most of the restrictions on secondary union activity would be 
prohibited.
 
189 Currently, the United States prohibits secondary 
strikes that induce or encourage a strike or other refusal to 
handle goods.190 In addition, U.S. laws prohibit strikes that 
threaten, coerce, or restrain any person.191 U.S. labor laws ban 
strikes to achieve secondary boycotts.192
The ILO does not comment on the permissibility of lock-
outs; some member states permit lockouts, while others prohib-
it lockouts.
 
193 In the United States, lockouts are permissible ab-
sent proof of an unlawful motive.194
 
 186. See generally Goldman & Corrada, supra note 
 A lockout in the United 
65, at 390–92 (discuss-
ing grievance procedure and arbitration). 
 187. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2012). The insulated period is the 60 day 
window before the expiration of a CBA. Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 
411. A strike that occurs during the insulated period causes employees to lose 
their protected status under the NLRA, and may in turn be dismissed by em-
ployers without violating § 158(a)(3). Id. Hot cargo agreements are prohibited 
by § 158(e) of the NLRA. NLRA § 158(e). Hot cargo agreements essentially are 
clauses with an employer not to handle goods produced by another employer 
with whom the union has a dispute, or that the union will refuse to handle 
non-union material. See Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 273. 
 188. ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 523. ILO Convention No. 98 “prohibits 
nearly all restrictions on the right to strike,” including many limitations and 
restrictions allowable under U.S. labor law. USCIB, supra note 59, at 7.  
 189. See USCIB, supra note 59, at 5–7 (including restrictions on hot-cargo 
agreements and secondary boycotts). 
 190. NLRA § 158(e). 
 191. NLRA § 158(b)(4). 
 192. NLRA § 158(b). 
 193. E.g. Igor Chernyshev, Decent Work Statistical Indicators: Strikes and 
Lockouts Statistics in the International Context, ILO 8–10 (June 1, 2003), 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/download/articles/2003-3.pdf 
(displaying strikes and lockouts statistics for ILO nations). While the right to 
strike derives from ILO Convention No. 87 through Article 3 (establishing the 
right of unions to “organize their administration and activities and to formu-
late their programmes”) and Article 10 (establishing the right of unions to 
pursue aims that work toward “furthering and defending the interests of 
workers or of employers”), no convention establishes a similar right to conduct 
a lockout. GERNIGON ET AL., supra note 170, at 8  
 194. The NLRA permits both offensive (when an employer and union are at 
a bargaining impasse) and defensive (threat to enhance the employer’s bar-
gaining power) lockouts. See Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 330; see 
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States must also have a “business or bargaining justification” 
and must not be “designed to destroy the union.”195
5. Public Employee Work Stoppages 
 
The ILO extends the fundamental right to strike, with few 
limitations, to public employees.196 Public workers in essential 
services197 and public servants exercising authority in the name 
of the state198 may be prohibited from work stoppages. The ILO 
allows a minimum safety service limitation “to the extent nec-
essary to comply with statutory safety requirements.”199 In ad-
dition, the ILO permits a minimum operation service limitation 
for public services of fundamental importance, as well as for 
non-essential services where the extent and duration of a work 
stoppage might result in an acute national emergency.200 If the 
United States were to comply with ILO standards, federal and 
state governments would face a reduced ability to restrict pub-
lic employees’ right to strike.201 While the ILO provides com-
pensation to those whose right to strike may be restricted, the 
United States does not generally offer any such compensa-
tion.202
 
also id. at 388 (arguing that contractual prohibitions against employer lock-
outs are, however, nearly as common as no-strike clauses). 
 
 195. Id. at 330. 
 196. ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶¶ 574, 576. 
 197. Id. ¶ 576. Compare id. ¶ 606 (defining minimum services as services 
where “the interruption of which would endanger the life, personal safety or 
health of the whole or part of the population”), with GORMAN & FINKIN, supra 
note 45, at 589–95 (discussing how an injunction may be issued if a strike, “af-
fecting an entire industry or a substantial part of an industry engaged in in-
terstate commerce, endangers or will endanger the national health or safety”). 
ILO standards disapprove of defining essential services as those that interfere 
with commerce since a “broad range of legitimate strike action could be im-
peded.” ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 592. 
 198. ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶¶ 574, 576. Employees in state-owned 
commercial and industrial enterprises retain their right to strike. Id. ¶ 577. 
 199. Id. ¶ 604. 
 200. Id. ¶ 606. An impartial and independent body settles disagreements 
on what is considered essential for purposes of minimum operation service 
limitations. Id. ¶ 613. This approach is similar to the NLRA. 
 201. See USCIB, supra note 59, at 7. 
 202. See ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶¶ 596, 600 (providing that compensa-
tion generally includes a corresponding denial of an employer’s right to lock-
out, and adequate, impartial, and speedy arbitration proceedings). 
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Currently, most public employee work stoppages are pro-
hibited in the United States.203 A number of alternatives do ex-
ist for U.S. state and local employees. In most states, either 
party can call for intervention by way of state mediation.204 At a 
bargaining impasse, most states allow either side to initiate a 
fact-finding procedure to help resolve a dispute.205 The majority 
of U.S public strikes result from municipal or school district 
employees.206
U.S. federal law imposes greater penalties for illegal public 
work stoppages than international labor law. For example, a 
union can be decertified if it encourages workers to participate 
in a prohibited work stoppage.
  
207 Additionally, employees may 
be prosecuted, a court may issue an injunction, and employees 
can become disqualified from further federal employment for an 
indefinite period of time.208 Under ILO standards, decertifica-
tion should only be possible through judicial channels.209
D. PROTECTION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE 
 The 
difference in treatment of public employee work stoppages cre-
ates a gulf between U.S. labor law and ILO standards. 
While the ILO and the United States provide similar levels 
of protection against anti-union discrimination, ILO standards 
afford greater protection for women, children, and noncitizen 
employees. 
1. Protection Against Anti-Union Discrimination 
The ILO considers anti-union discrimination to be one of 
the most serious violations of freedom of association princi-
ples.210
 
 203. See Goldman & Corrada, supra note 
 Under the ILO, the CFA makes sure the anti-union dis-
crimination standards set by member states are in accordance 
65, at 405 (“In the minority of 
states that permit public employee strikes, the right to strike is not extended 
to all government workers.”). 
 204. Id. at 338. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 404. In 1981, President Reagan attempted to enforce prohibi-
tions of public employee work stoppages by dismissing 11,000 air traffic con-
trollers. Id. at 405. 
 207. Id. at 405. 
 208. Id. 
 209. See ILO DIGEST, supra note 35, ¶ 687. 
 210. Id. ¶ 769 (maintaining that anti-union discrimination “may jeopardize 
the very existence of trade unions”). 
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with freedom of association principles.211 ILO Convention No. 
98 provides that employees are protected against discrimina-
tion during hiring, employment, and dismissal.212 U.S. labor 
laws provide similar protection as the ILO, but exclude more 
employees from coverage.213 In order to amount to an anti-
discrimination violation under the NLRA, an employee must 
show that (1) the discrimination occurred “because of union ac-
tivity or affiliation,” (2) the discrimination resulted in “adverse 
or favored treatment,” and (3) the treatment “tended to encour-
age or discourage union membership or activity.”214 Additional-
ly, ILO and U.S. remedies for anti-union discrimination are the 
same—a combination of reinstatement and back pay.215
Furthermore, the ILO emphasizes increased anti-
discrimination protection for union representatives and lead-
ers.
  
216 The few situations where ILO standards do not protect 
union representatives and leaders from dismissal include the 
performance of union activities on employer time, the use of an 
employer’s personnel for union purposes, and the use of one’s 
business position to put improper pressure on another employ-
ee.217 U.S. labor laws provide union officials with some level of 
special employment protections during their tenure in office.218
 
 211. Id. ¶ 774. 
 
 212. ILO Convention No. 98, supra note 14, at 258–61. 
 213. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157–158 (2012) (forbidding discrimination due to 
union activity in hiring, firing, and other means of employment, and providing 
an analogous level of coverage to the right to organize); see also NLRA § 152(3) 
(defining who constitutes an employee for NLRA purposes). 
 214. Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 230. 
 215. See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 45, at 187, 192 (stating that NLRA 
§ 10(c) grants the NLRB the ability to require reinstatement and backpay for 
NLRA § 8(a)(3) anti-union discrimination violations); ILO DIGEST, supra note 
35, ¶¶ 837, 841, 843 (providing, furthermore, that if reinstatement is not pos-
sible, the victim should be wholly compensated). 
 216. “[A]dditional measures should be taken to ensure fuller protection for 
leaders of all organizations . . . against any discriminatory acts.” ILO DIGEST, 
supra note 35, ¶ 773; see also id. ¶¶ 799–801 (emphasizing that worker repre-
sentatives are entitled to “effective protection against any act prejudicial to 
them . . . based on their status or activities as workers’ representatives”). 
 217. Id. ¶ 809. The performance of union activities on employer time and 
the use of an employer’s personnel for union purposes may, however, be pro-
tected against anti-union discrimination if an agreement, between the union 
officers and the employer, allowing such activities is in place. See id. ¶¶ 800, 
809. 
 218. U.S. employers may give special benefits to union representatives 
with responsibilities in administrating the CBA. See Goldman & Corrada, su-
pra note 65, at 236. For example, a CBA often gives special seniority to union 
representatives to protect them “from layoff and grant them early recall” as 
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2. Protection Against Discrimination 
The 1998 Declaration considers the elimination of discrim-
ination in employment to be a fundamental principle and right 
at work.219 As an ILO member state, the United States must re-
spect, promote, and realize the fundamental principles and 
rights established in the 1998 Declaration.220 The ILO (through 
Convention No. 111) and the United States (through Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) both prohibit discrimination on 
the basis of race, color, sex, religion, or national origin.221 Addi-
tionally, ILO standards and U.S. labor laws grant certain em-
ployers a bona fide occupational qualification during the hiring 
process, allowing them to take into account otherwise prohibit-
ed employee characteristics.222 In the United States, occupa-
tional qualifications must apply to the essence of an employer’s 
business and must be reasonably necessary for the normal op-
eration of business.223
Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a U.S. employer may 
not retaliate against an employee who has made a charge, as-
sisted with, or participated in a Title VII investigation.
 
224 The 
two most common Title VII violations are disparate treatment 
violations (which require an intent to discriminate) and dispar-
ate impact violations (no intent to discriminate necessary).225
 
long as the benefited representatives “need to be available in the workplace to 
perform their responsibilities administering the collective agreement.” Id. The 
NLRA prohibits granting special benefits “that are unrelated to facilitating 
the union representative’s ability to counsel and speak for the workers.” Id. at 
237. 
  
 219. See 1998 Declaration, supra note 10, at art. 2(d). 
 220. Id. at art. 2. 
 221. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–
2000e-17 (2012); ILO Convention No. 111, supra note 16, at 32–37. In addi-
tion, ILO Convention No. 111 provides for the right to pursue economic well-
being in conditions of freedom, dignity, and economic security. Id. at 32–33.  
 222. See ILO Convention No. 111, supra note 16, at 32 (“Any distinction, 
exclusion or preference in respect of a particular job based on the inherent re-
quirements thereof shall not be deemed to be discrimination.”); Goldman & 
Corrada, supra note 65, at 193–94 (discussing how the Supreme Court takes a 
narrow approach to what constitutes a bona fide occupational qualification). 
 223. See Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 194. The burden lies with 
the employer to show that a bona fide occupational qualification exists. Id. 
 224. Title VII, 42 U.S.C § 2000e-3(a). To be considered employer retalia-
tion, an employer’s actions must be materially adverse enough “to dissuade a 
reasonable employee from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” 
Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 204. 
 225. For a disparate treatment violation, establishing a McDonnell Doug-
las prima facie case creates an inference of unlawful intent. To do this, the 
plaintiff must show four elements—that the employee is a member of a pro-
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Affirmative action remains a relatively unique concept to 
U.S. labor law, and continues to be a controversial issue.226 The 
Supreme Court upheld the use of affirmative action when 
adopted for remedial purposes and developed a two-part test.227 
Affirmative action programs must be aimed at correcting a 
“manifest imbalance” in a traditionally segregated job catego-
ry,”228 and must not “unduly” trample on the interests of major-
ity group members.229 Furthermore, affirmative action pro-
grams may not be used to maintain a racially balanced 
workforce but rather only to obtain one.230
3. Women in the Workplace—Equal Pay for Equal Work 
 
The ILO Constitution’s Preamble and ILO Convention No. 
100 establish the principle of “equal remuneration for work of 
equal value.”231
 
tected class, was qualified for the position, and suffered adverse action, and 
that the employer treated persons outside the protected class differently. 
Gorman & Corrada, supra note 
 U.S. labor law protects women’s wages through 
65, at 192; see also id. at 192–97 (discussing 
the application of disparate treatment law). Disparate impact violations are 
practices that may be fair in form but are discriminatory in operation. Id. at 
197; see also id. at 197–98. 
 226. See id. at 194–96 (stating that the lawfulness of affirmative action is 
one of the most controversial issues in U.S. labor law); see also ILO DIGEST, 
supra note 35 (making no mention of affirmative action). 
 227. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208–09 
(1979); Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 194–97 (explaining that affirm-
ative action plans must be remedial and satisfy a two-part test); see also 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (prohibiting certain forms of discrimination in the work-
place); 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1 (2013) (stating that an employer who takes volun-
tary action to “improve opportunities for minorities and women” in order to 
“overcome the effects of past or present . . . barriers to equal employment op-
portunity” is insulated from the unlawful employment practices named in Ti-
tle VII). 
 228. Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 195 (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (adding that a showing of disparity between the minority or women 
workers and those in the labor pool is required to demonstrate a manifest im-
balance). 
 229. See United Steelworkers, 443 U.S. at 208 (stating that the affirmative 
action plan at issue does not “unnecessarily trammel” the interests of the ma-
jority group members); Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 195 (discussing 
what “unnecessarily trammel” means). 
 230. See Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 195 (“Moreover, an affirm-
ative action plan may be used only to attain, and not to maintain, a racially 
balanced workforce.”). The Supreme Court thus far has only considered the 
lawfulness of affirmative action plans “when a remedial purpose was put for-
ward to justify the plan.” Id. 
 231. ILO, Constitution, supra note 6, at 40 (emphasis omitted); accord ILO 
Convention No. 100, supra note 15, at 36.  
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the Equal Pay Act,232 which prohibits discrimination in wages 
paid for “equal work on jobs the performance of which requires 
equal skill, effort and responsibility and which are performed 
under similar working conditions.”233 Accordingly, the general 
U.S. standard under The Equal Pay Act provides for equal pay 
for substantially equal work,234 whereas the ILO standard pro-
vides for equal pay for “comparable work,”235 or work of “compa-
rable worth.”236 Due to this difference in the standard—equal 
work versus comparable work—U.S. labor law provides weaker 
protection against wage discrimination than ILO standards.237
4. Treatment of Child Workers 
 
ILO Convention No. 138 allows member states to set inter-
nal minimum age standards but requires that the minimum 
age of child employment be no lower than the age of completion 
of compulsory schooling.238 Additionally, ILO Convention No. 
138 requires a minimum age of eighteen for work “likely to 
jeopardise the health, safety, or morals.”239
 
 232. See The Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012) (prohibiting wage dis-
crimination on the basis of sex); Goldman & Corrada, supra note 
 While U.S. labor law 
conforms to many requirements of ILO Convention No. 138, 
65, at 214–16 
(stating that the Equal Pay Act covers all employees covered by the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (in addition to executive, administrative, and professional em-
ployees), and claiming that the Equal Pay Act is aimed solely at the elimina-
tion of unequal pay based on sex). 
 233. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 215 (explaining that a prima facie vio-
lation of the Equal Pay Act arises when there exists unequal pay for equal 
work at the same place of business due to sex). 
 234. See 29 C.F.R. § 1620.13 (2013) (“The equal work standard does not re-
quire that compared jobs be identical, only that they be substantially equal.”). 
 235. See Edward E. Potter, The Growing Significance of International La-
bor Standards on the Global Economy, 28 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 243, 
258 (2005). 
 236. See, e.g., Christopher McCrudden, Comparable Worth: A Common Di-
lemma, 11 YALE J. INT’L L. 396, 402 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(discussing the history of the concept of equal pay for work of “comparable 
worth”). 
 237. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1620.13 (providing substantially equal work 
standard), and Goldman & Corrada, supra note 65, at 215 (“[W]ithout unequal 
pay for equal work, there is no Equal Pay Act violation, even if a woman is be-
ing paid less because she is a woman.”), with ILO Convention No. 100, supra 
note 15, at 304–07 (providing an equal pay for equal work standard). 
 238. The ILO sets the minimum age of child employment at fifteen, with 
the possibility of fourteen for insufficiently developed countries. ILO Conven-
tion No. 138, supra note 17, at 298–301. 
 239. Id. at 300. Types of employment considered to be “likely to jeopardise 
the health, safety, or morals” are determined at the national level. Id. 
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conflicts exist in areas of youth employment that are exempt 
from the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and state child labor 
laws.240 The FLSA protects child workers in the United States 
by prohibiting most employment of children under fourteen and 
by restricting the types of employment, hours, and conditions of 
children under eighteen.241
The United States has ratified ILO Convention No. 182, 
which seeks to eliminate the worst forms of child labor.
  
242 ILO 
Convention No. 182 applies to all child workers under eight-
een.243 The Convention also prohibits the use of children in 
slavery or similar practices, in pornography, in work likely to 
harm the child’s health, safety, or morals, and the procuring or 
offering of a child for illicit activities’.244 In addition, ILO Con-
vention No. 182 requires member states to take effective 
measures to promote the education of children—in particular, 
children who have been exposed to the worst forms of child la-
bor.245
5. Rights of Noncitizen Employees 
 
ILO standards provide that, once employed, everyone is en-
titled to protection against anti-union discrimination without 
regard to citizenship status.246
 
 240. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 
(2012). The FLSA prohibits all employment of children under fourteen when 
the enterprise “ships goods in interstate commerce.” Goldman & Corrada, su-
pra note 
 The ILO provides greater protec-
tion of noncitizen employees and criticizes the U.S. approach 
for not providing adequate protection to undocumented workers 
65, at 93. Children age fourteen and fifteen may not be employed in 
manufacturing and mining. Additional FLSA limits apply to children ages six-
teen and seventeen across various industries. Id. State child labor laws often 
provide additional limits to child employment. See id. at 93–94; USCIB, supra 
note 59, at 8 (arguing that U.S. compliance with ILO Convention No. 138 
would be difficult due to “widely varied” state child labor laws). 
 241. See supra note 240. 
 242. ILO Convention No. 182, supra note 3, at 163–64. The ILO intended 
ILO Convention No. 182 to complement ILO Convention 138. See id.  
 243. Id. at 164–65. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. at 165–66. 
 246. See David Weissbrodt, Remedies for Undocumented Noncitizens in the 
Workplace: Using International Law to Narrow the Holding of Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1424, 1430 (2008) (stating that 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has held that once the employ-
ment relationship has begun, the noncitizen worker “acquires rights as a 
worker . . . irrespective of his regular or irregular status in the State of em-
ployment”). 
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who choose to exercise their freedom of association rights.247 In 
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, an undocumented 
employee distributed authorization cards as part of a unioniza-
tion effort, and his employer subsequently terminated him.248 
The NLRB found that the employer had illegally fired the un-
documented employee and ordered back pay as relief.249 The 
Supreme Court, citing conflict with public policy goals of the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), vacated 
the NLRB’s award of back pay.250 The Court reasoned that the 
undocumented employee should not be able to recover back pay 
since he was a noncitizen and fraudulently obtained employ-
ment.251 As a result, the only available remedies to protect un-
documented employees who exercise their freedom of associa-
tion rights are the issuance of a cease and desist order and 
posting of notice at the employer’s business.252
The CFA issued a decision regarding Hoffman and ex-
pressed concern that removing back pay as a viable remedy for 
noncitizens could harm worker safety and well-being.
 
253 In fact, 
the CFA found the Supreme Court’s decision in Hoffman to vio-
late the fundamental principles behind the ILO constitution, as 
the Hoffman decision functionally denied noncitizen employees 
the freedom to associate and join unions.254
 
 247. See ILO, Report in Which the Committee Requests to Be Kept In-
formed of Development ¶¶ 555, 559–68, 610 (Nov. 2003), http://www.ilo.org/ 
dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:50002:P50002_COMPLAINT_TEXT_ID:2907332 
[hereinafter CFA Case No. 2227] (concluding that the NLRB’s remedial 
measures are “inadequate to ensure effective protection against acts of anti-
union discrimination”). 
 The CFA criticized 
the Supreme Court’s weighing of the policy goals of the IRCA 
against the available remedies under the NLRA, stating that 
 248. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 140 (2001). 
 249. Id. at 140–41. 
 250. See id. at 140. The undocumented employee had fraudulently obtained 
employment. The Supreme Court declined to address whether back pay may 
be an appropriate remedy in instances where the employer knowingly hired an 
undocumented worker in violation of the IRCA. See Weissbrodt, supra note 
246, at 1426–27. 
 251. See Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 150–51. In the years since the Hoffman deci-
sion, U.S. courts remain confused about the scope of Hoffman and what em-
ployment remedies under the NLRA are unavailable to undocumented work-
ers. Weissbrodt, supra note 246, at 1445. 
 252. CFA Case No. 2227, supra note 247, ¶ 609. 
 253. See id. ¶ 565; Weissbrodt, supra note 246, at 1431. 
 254. See Weissbrodt, supra note 246, at 1431. 
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human rights must always have priority over public policy 
goals.255
Additionally, the CFA criticized the available remedies for 
undocumented employees under U.S. labor law—the U.S. rem-
edies for undocumented workers serve only as possible deter-
rents for future employer discriminatory acts, though they do 
not sanction the actual discriminatory act committed by the 
employer.
 
256 As of November 2011, the CFA still considers the 
United States to be in violation of ILO standards pertaining to 
the rights of undocumented employees.257
  CONCLUSION   
 
The United States and the ILO take varying approaches to 
the right to organize, the right to bargain collectively, the right 
to strike, treatment of public employees, the rights of nonciti-
zen workers, treatment of children, anti-union discrimination, 
and treatment of women. Despite being bound to respect and 
promote the principles and rights established in the ILO Con-
stitution and the principle of freedom of association, the United 
States tends to provide lower levels of coverage and protection 
for employees than required by ILO standards. The lower level 
of protection and coverage for U.S. employees remains especial-
ly visible in the right to strike, treatment of public employees, 
and rights of noncitizen workers. To achieve a higher level of 
compliance with ILO standards, the United States would need 
to ratify a greater number of conventions (particularly the core 
conventions) and accept more recommendations.  
 
 255. See id. 
 256. CFA Case No. 2227, supra note 247, ¶ 609. 
 257. See ILO, Effect Given to the Recommendations of the Committee and 
the Governing Body ¶ 52 (Nov. 2011), http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p= 
1000:50002:0::NO:50002:P50002_COMPLAINT_TEXT_ID:2907354. 
